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The Legal Status of Russian Refugees, 1921-1936 
1. Introduction 
During 1919-1920, thousands of Russian refugees crossed the Black Sea from Southern 
Russia to Constantinople. These were military evacuations of the anti-Bolshevik armies, 
though each included thousands of civilians.  Simultaneously, Russian subjects left across all 
the borders of the former Russian Empire as it was engulfed in class war and imperial 
collapse. Constantinople claimed the attention of the new post-war international community. 
Constantinople was under Allied occupation and the Allies had responsibility for the 
Russians they supported during the Russian Civil War.  The arrival of these refugees proved 
to be a financial, logistical and political burden to them. Transnational relief organisations 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Save the Children 
Union were concerned with the humanitarian crisis in Constantinople. Such organisations and 
interested states put pressure on the new League of Nations to take up the problem of the 
refugees, as it could only be resolved on an international level. In June 1921, the League of 
Nations created a High Commission for Russian Refugees (HCR), the precursor to the 
UNHCR. The remit of this new body was to ‘liquidate’ the refugee problem through 
repatriation or naturalisation; to help coordinate relief efforts; to find work for the refugees 
and to examine legal solutions.  
This article will examine the measures developed within the HCR for the legal status of the 
refugees. From the beginning legal status was discussed, although the HCR gave it lower 
priority as its preferred solutions were repatriation, colonisation or naturalization. The 
dominating legal issue for the refugees was their statelessness in a world from which 
meaningful rights were derived from state protection.  Russian refugee legal experts 
positioned the solution to the refugee issue as a social and juridical one, where refugees 
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would adapt and absorb into their new states and be gradually treated as ‘nationals’ in so far 
as that was compatible with their status as aliens.
1
 Their legal solutions would involve the 
creation of the refugee as a legal category and securing certain rights and protection, 
including that of movement and exemption from reciprocity. This involved states agreeing to 
accept limits on state sovereignty, as through the 1920s and 1930s they agreed to adhere to 
Arrangements and Conventions which gave special protection to the refugees in their 
jurisdictions. This incremental work laid the foundations of legal protection for refugees in 
the twentieth century.  
 
2. The High Commission for Russian Refugees and Repatriation  
Fritdjof Nansen, the Norwegian diplomat, scientist and explorer was chosen as the High 
Commissioner for Russian Refugees. It was hoped that the League of Nations would arrange 
their repatriation, which was seen as the most viable solution and in 1920 Nansen had helped 
organise the repatriation of the Central Powers’ POWs from Russia and had established 
working relations with Moscow. Like others, Nansen believed that contact with the West 
would moderate the Bolshevik regime,that Russia’s main problem was its economic 
backwardness and that Russia’s economic reconstruction was essential for international 
peace. The Bolsheviks were willing to contemplate the return of certain sections of the 
emigration that could help with economic reconstruction, chiefly Cossacks who had often 
been skilled farmers in their wealthy agricultural regions of Southern Russia and Ukraine.  
They also expressed an interest in the return of medical students and doctors.
2
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The Soviet Union was not a member of the League, so Nansen and his personal 
representatives, John Gorvin, a British civil servant from the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Norwegian Vidkun Quisling, negotiated with representatives of the Soviet government over 
the repatriation of Cossacks in 1922-24. 
3
   The Soviet government issued wide Amnesty 
Decrees in November 1922 to soldiers and officers of the White who could demonstrate that 
they had fought against the Bolsheviks due to ‘deception and force’. A Soviet Red Cross 
mission was established in Bulgaria – the only state willing to host it - to organise the 
repatriation across the Black Sea to Russia in 1923.  The repatriation programme, in which so 
many (non-Russian) hopes were invested, never solved the Russian refugee ‘problem’. The 
HCR estimated that only some 6,000 refugees, chiefly Cossacks, returned on these official 
schemes.
4
  The majority of Russian refugees did not want to return while the Bolsheviks were 
in power. Optimistic claims about numbers wishing to return by Nansen and those who had a 
vested interest in the success of the scheme were wishful thinking. Russian refugee lawyers 
argued that under the Soviet state returnees would have no legal protection despite claims to 
the contrary. Russian refugee organisations across the political spectrum opposed it, partly as 
they felt that voluntary repatriation could jeopardise the right to asylum in Europe.  The mass 
famine in the Volga region in 1921 acted as a check to return. Political intrigue and a coup in 
Bulgaria led to the closing of the Soviet Red Cross mission. By 1924, the Soviet government 
had entered a period of relative political stability and economic development and seems to 
have felt that the HCR’s involvement in checking up on the repatriated was an unacceptable 
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limit to state sovereignty. They withdrew consent for repatriation.
5
  HCR negotiations with 
the Soviet regime ended in May 1924.
6
  
There was some limited legal movement to and from the Soviet Union in the 1920s under the 
relatively liberal policy of the New Economic Policy, as well as illegal movement across the 
borders. Legal movement largely ended with the general tightening of security after Stalin 
assumed power in 1928 when restrictions on the internal and external movement of Soviet 
citizens were put into place. In the interwar period, Russians in Europe fell into two 
categories; Russian refugees who had left during the Civil War and Russian minorities in the 
new states arising from the end of the Russian Empire and out of the Treaty of Versailles. 
The first group only were the concern of the HCR. Russian refugees initially arrived in all the 
states bordering or close to Russia, particularly Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Germany, 
Romania, Turkey, Greece and China. These were quickly joined as places of first asylum by 
the Slav states of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as thousands of refugees were 
moved there with the consent of the governments in the early 1920s. These states, and then 
France and Belgium, would form the core of the international refugee regime. The second 
group, that of settled Russian minorities in Poland, the Baltic States and Romania were 
protected under the minorities’ legislation of the League of Nations.  
3. Determining the Legal Status of Refugees 
The HCR’s responsibility was to define the refugees’ legal status. Belgium, France, 
Czechoslovakia and Switzerland had already asked the League to clarify this in spring 1921. 
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This issue was raised by Russian refugee lawyers and ex-diplomats; as shall be seen, they 
were intimately involved in the work behind the scenes of developing refugee law.  
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A series of Soviet decrees in late 1921 deprived Russians abroad of their citizenship, 
rendering them stateless.
8
  They usually lacked identity certificates or passports, and without 
with a state’s protection behind them could not travel across borders. However, alongside 
repatriation, the HCR policy was to transfer the refugee males out of Constantinople to other 
states on work contracts. The arrival of large groups of skilled males of working age on the 
fringes of Europe in 1920 was both a threat and an opportunity. France was desperate for 
male labour to work on economic reconstruction after the war. The new Czechoslovak state 
and its industrialists (at that time Russophile) welcomed Russian labour for agricultural 
reconstruction or the Škoda works. The new states of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria wished for 
groups of labour to work on large infrastructure projects as well as also having Russophile 
elites. In 1922 for example, Nansen arranged for the transfer of five thousand refugees to 
Bulgaria to work on railroad construction.
 9
 As Zolberg comments, in international migration 
regimes are concerned, ‘statecraft and humanitarianism went hand in hand.’10 In the early 
1920s the HCR and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), to whom refugee work was 
transferred in 1924, moved tens of thousands of Russian refugees around Europe to work. 
Passports were also important to move the refugees on if states wished. In 1925, for example, 
the Refugee Service of the ILO in Belgrade arranged for the emigration of around 2,000 
Russian refugees out of Bulgaria, mainly to France, after the Bulgarian government 
complained that Russian and Armenian refugees were a ‘source of danger to production and 
social peace.’11  
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As John Torpey has written states successfully monopolised the right to control movement in 
the modern period, ‘particularly though by no means exclusively across international 
boundaries.’12 State sovereignty became uniquely embedded in this control and ‘sovereignty 
is nowhere more absolute than in matters of emigration, naturalisation, nationality, and 
expulsion’.13 At the same time, the identification revolution made it easier to distinguish 
through files and documentation who was a national and who was an alien. In France for 
example the category of ‘immigrant worker’, which eventually became synonymous with 
‘foreigner’, was created in the late nineteenth century. 14 The Great War saw states introduce 
even tighter restrictions on immigration, migration, passport control and residency rights. The 
Aliens Restriction Act was passed in Britain in 1914, followed by an an Aliens Order in 
1920. Passport controls were reintroduced in France during the war, and in 1917 an 
individual identity card became mandatory for all foreigners above age fifteen.
15
 Italy and 
Germany also saw new restrictions on foreigners entering and these continued into the 
interwar era. As the state became more ‘national’ and rights were connected with citizenship, 
those who were no longer citizens of a state became a legal anomaly and had no rights. The 
main principle which governed the status of aliens in individual states, particularly under the 
Napoleonic Code, was the principle of reciprocity which clearly could not be applied to 
Russian refugees. The passport and identity issue was seen as most urgent. Without these, the 
refugees would remain unprotected and potentially ineligible for social welfare, such as 
access to education for their children.  At first therefore, there was considerable variation in 
what laws states applied to Russian refugees. Indeed in August 1921 Nansen held an Inter-
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governmental Conference in Geneva where it was agreed that each state should deal with the 
legal status of refugees individually. 
16
  
While Constantinople was under Allied control, Russians were treated under the Ottoman 
capitulation laws. The French state applied Imperial Russian civil law to Russians within its 
border, so the principle of reciprocity held, until 1924 when it recognised the Soviet Union. 
Some of the confusion can be seen from the statement of the HCR representative in Vienna in 
1922:  
The Austrian government has decided that for the future Russian refugees may obtain 
‘Staatenlossenpässe’ from the police authorities, which will be regarded abroad as 
Austrian passports. This will regularise the position of Russian refugees in Austria, 
who, until the recognition by Austria of the Soviet government in March last, received 
papers from the Spanish Legation in Vienna.
17
  
The need though for a consistent and internationalised approach was recognised from the 
beginning and at all meetings the need for Russian refugees to have identity papers was 
discussed. The issue was passed to the Legal Section of the League, with the involvement of 
Russian refugee lawyers. It was suggested that Nansen, under the authority of the League, 
could issue them with an identity certificate, although it was acknowledged that this would 
give refugees no legal protection. Another suggestion was that states accepting the refugees 
should issue them provisional passports for a period of twelve months, renewed on good 
behaviour. Another was to regularise the status of the Russians by continuing to recognise the 
Tsarist Russian embassies and consulates abroad as legal representative of the refugees and 
for Russian Imperial law to be applied to them under the principle of reciprocity (this was the 
preferred solution of many Russian organisations). Another was to have one of the Allied 
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powers issue protective passports. Another option apparently emanating from the HCR was 
to internationalise a ‘controversial territory’ (Constantinople) and place it under the control of 
the League of Nations. This could become a territory to which refugees could be ‘repatriated’ 
by states who no longer wanted them or refused to accept them; it was considered states 
would be more likely to allow refugees in if they could send them away again.  
18
 In the end 
the decision was made that the HCR should develop an internationally accepted identity 
certificate. 
 
4. The Nansen Passport and the 1922 Arrangement: the right to a legal identity  
The solution for the problem of providing an internationally recognised identity document 
was the so-called Nansen Passport, formalised on 5 July 1922 in the Arrangement with 
Respect to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees. This was approved at an 
Inter-Governmental Conference attended by representatives of sixteen governments. The 
Nansen Passport was not a proper passport, but an identity certificate for an individual 
refugee, valid for one year.  The HCR and the states concerned also defined who was eligible 
for a Nansen passport. Russian representatives did not want the word ‘refugee’ on the 
certificate and insisted that the term ‘Russian’ be used to cover all the nationalities of the 
former Russian Empire.  Konstantin Gul’kevich, the ex-Tsarist diplomat who was based in 
Geneva and advised the HCR on refugee issues, apparently suggested the phrase ‘person of 
Russian origin who has not acquired another nationality.’19  
 This became the kernel of the legal definition of a refugee in the interwar period, which 
would become finalised in 1928 and used in the 1933 Convention.  It was a group definition 
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based on nationality and the deprivation of the protection by the state of origin or its 
successor.  This was different to the 1936 International Agreement for refugees from Nazi 
Germany, which defined refugees as persons who were deprived of the protection of the 
German state but crucially left it to the responsibility of the individual state where asylum 
was being requested to determine who was eligible for this refugee status. Nor was it an 
individual designation based on fear of political persecution, as it would become after the 
Second World War. Later on, the HCR protection was expanded to other groups of refugees 
of Christian minorities from the Ottoman Empire, who had been subject to violent forced 
displacement in this period. The largest group of these, the Armenians became eligible for 
Nansen passports in 1924 under the definition ‘any person of Armenian origin, formerly a 
subject of the Ottoman Empire, who does not enjoy the protection of the Turkish Republic 
and who has not acquired any other nationality.’  In 1928, the right to hold a Nansen passport 
was given to Assyrians and Assyro-Chaldeans who had been displaced largely to Syria and 
Iraq during the Turkish War of Independence. The Nansen passport was also given to several 
hundred Turks who had earlier worked for the Allied occupation of Turkey. In 1935 it was 
extended to several thousand Saar refugees after the region voted to reunite with Germany.  
The Nansen Passport was a watered down version of an draft by the League’s Legal Section 
and Russian lawyers which would have given the refugee some of the same rights as citizens, 
including the right of free movement and the right to work. This was considered too great an 
infringement of state sovereignty and was changed by France.
 20
 The Nansen Passport 
facilitated moving on from the first country of arrival to find employment. One of its  major 
drawbacks was that it did not give the refugee the automatic right to return to the state in 
which it had been issued. This made some states reluctant to accept refugees even with 
Nansen passports, as they were not deportable.   
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The Nansen Passport is considered a major achievement of the interwar refugee regime. 
Apart from the refugees themselves, the only states it benefitted were the states of first arrival 
who could hope their ‘burden’ of refugees might move on. Yet thirty-two states had 
recognised it by 1923 and it was eventually recognised by over fifty. The HCR persuaded 
states to adhere to the Arrangements by arguing that the Nansen passport would facilitate 
employment, help ascertain how many refugees they had and facilitate their departure 
elsewhere. For those who had recognised the Soviet Union, it helped politically that the state 
could recognise the refugees through the intermediary of the League. It did very little to limit 
state sovereignty, and states continued to treat refugees in line with their own interests, which 
probably accounts for its wide adoption. States were willing to recognise it as it had little 
impact on their right to regulate entry and gave no rights to the individual refugee, apart from 
the right to be recognised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The Problems of the Nansen Passport and the 1926 Arrangement 
11 
 
After the end of the repatriation scheme in 1924 technical and administrative responsibilities 
for refugee work were transferred to the Refugee Service of the International Labour Office 
(ILO), while Nansen retained responsibility for the political, legal and financial aspects. 
Major Frank Johnson was both Chief of the Refugee Section of the ILO and Assistant High 
Commissioner for the HCR. He was the key figure in refugee work throughout the period.  
Russian refugee lawyers and activists were not satisfied with the Nansen Passport and 
continued working towards further improvements in the legal status of the refugees. The 
émigré Central Juridical Committee in Paris sent Johnson a memorandum in late 1925 with 
suggested changes to the Nansen passport system and the legal rights of the refugees, many 
of which were would be incorporated in a new Arrangement of 1926. Russian refugee 
lawyers saw freedom of movement as a human right that was still being denied by states to 
refugees.
 21
  Their memorandum listed ways in which states were still avoiding or moderating 
the Arrangement of 1922. Nansen passports were being denied to certain categories of 
refugee; those who had arrived in the state after a fixed date (usually connected with the 
state’s recognition of the Soviet Union) or those coming from areas of the former Russian 
Empire not currently within the border of the Soviet Union or even the Russian Federative 
Socialist Republic. Some states would only give Nansen passports to those who had promised 
to leave the state. Others were demanding expensive notarised documents or even statements 
from the Soviet embassy that the refugee was not a citizen of the USSR. Some states were 
threatening those without Nansen passports with forced repatriation
 22
 Lithuania was strictly 
limiting the number of Nansen passports it was handing out and Estonia was refusing to 
accept the Nansen passport at all.
23
 All state interactions with the HCR were voluntary: in 
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February 1923, the Yugoslav government told the HCR that it was dealing with the Russian 
refugee issue on its own and had no need to work with it.
24
  
The Russian lawyers reiterated their original resolutions to the problem of legal status and 
identification; that local émigré committees, recognised by individual states, should be 
allowed to approve identity claims.  They wanted the Nansen passport to be eligible for a 
three year period (instead of one) and family members to be included.  Further, they claimed 
that the strict visa regime imposed during the Great War was loosening in Europe from 1922, 
but not for Russian refugees.  The lawyers wanted the refugees to have the same general 
rights to visas as other citizens of the state and also the automatic right of return as well as 
free movement within states. They also suggested that The League of Nations or the ILO 
should manage the Nansen passport system itself and not leave it to individual states, though 
they accepted this was unlikely to happen yet as it would be a step too far.  
A major stumbling block to the resolution of the refugee problem was that the traditional 
migration states which had absorbed Europe’s surplus populations were closing their doors. 
The US and Canada refused to recognise the Nansen passport.  In 1921, the Canadian 
government passed Order-in-Council P.C. 2669, which stipulated that only immigrants from 
the British Isles and the US could arrive without passports. All others had to have a valid 
passport less than a year old and had to obtain visas in their country of origin.
25
 The Minister 
of Immigration and Colonization declared in the House of Commons that in order to ‘hold 
back the flood’ of refugees desperate to leave Europe they were introducing a $250 financial 
requirement for all refugees apart from agricultural workers and domestics and a ‘through 
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passage’ requirement that all refugees must arrive in Canada directly from their country of 
birth or citizenship. This put insurmountable obstacles in the way of Russian refugees. 
26
 
Canada would not recognise the Nansen passport as it gave no guaranteed right that they 
could return un-naturalised immigrants who turned out to be undesirable. Churchill argues 
that this was a cover for the fact that the Canadian authorities did not want to accept Russian 
and Armenian refugees per se, as they still refused to accept refugees even when some states, 
keen to move their refugees on, did start to guarantee a five year return period.
27
 The 
Canadian government took the position that the Russian refugees should be repatriated or 
assimilated into European states. They were unwilling to take the burden and responsibility 
for refugees and kept them out through non-recognition of the Nansen passport and high 
financial requirements.  The HCR worked tirelessly and futilely to break down the resistance 
of Canada, the United States to the admission of Russian refugees, who they presented as 
excellent agricultural workers.  
On 10 May 1926 there was another Inter-Governmental Conference in Geneva on refugee 
identity documents, with the participation of twenty-four states.  The Conference was to 
again define who was entitled to receive a Nansen passport; to make further changes to the 
passport system; to determine the numbers of refugees in various countries; and to create a 
revolving fund to provide for the cost of the transportation and settlement of refugees abroad. 
The Russian lawyers did not get what they ultimately wanted, which was for the Nansen 
Passport to become a real passport. This was rejected by states.
28
 Nonetheless, the legal status 
of refugees was improved incrementally. Provision 3 recommended that the Nansen passport 
holder should have the general right to a return visa for up to a year, ‘on the understanding 
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that Governments shall be free to make exceptions to this principle in special cases.’ They 
should also have greater rights to entry, exit and transit visas. Children should be included on 
their parents’ passports. A Nansen stamp was also introduced, in which refugees paid a small 
sum which went into a fund for loans to refugees to set up businesses and facilitate their 
emigration to South America.
29
  
The definition for the Russians was also expanded to ‘any person of Russian origin, who does 
not enjoy, or has ceased to enjoy, the protection of the government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and has not taken any other nationality.’30 The Arrangement of 12 May 
1926 clarified that ‘Russian’ referred to an old legal national identity and country of origin 
and not ethnicity, and also meant from the entire territory of the former Russian Empire. 
31
 
This stopped the use of cut-off dates for who could be eligible for a Nansen passport and also 
stopped states refusing to issue Nansen passports to Russians originally from the formed 
limitrophe states or from non-Russian areas of the USSR. This was a juridical and non-
political definition. This new Arrangement was endorsed by twenty-three states; Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cuba, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, UK, Greece, Hungary, India, Latvia, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, and Yugoslavia.  
 
The 1928 Arrangement 
A Central Commission for the Study of the Condition of Russian and Armenian Refugees 
was founded within the Nansen Office in 1926 which included Konstantin Gulkevitch, 
Jacques Rubinstein, Baron Boris Nolde and Andre Mandelstam, all key figures in the 
development of refugee law.  They continued to push for more protection for refugees, 
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particularly in terms of the rights of the most favoured foreigners (exemption from 
reciprocity) and the rights to return or restraints on expulsion. They argued that a formal 
Convention between states defining the international status of refugees was needed to 
guarantee this protection.  
Stateless refugees were a priori excluded from the category of most favoured foreigner, 
whose social rights (employment and social welfare) were facilitated by bilateral agreements 
between the home state and state of immigration.  Rights dependent on being a foreigner 
became much more important due to the increasingly restrictive policy towards aliens. By the 
late 1920s states, including Poland, Czechoslovakia and France, were introducing restrictive 
labour legislation to protect national labour markets. In 1928 for example, Czechoslovakia 
passed a law that anyone who had arrived in the state after January 1923 was not allowed to 
get employment without a special permit.
32
 A law of 10 August 1932 would restrict the 
number of foreign employees in certain enterprises and businesses in France.  This had a 
negative impact on Russian refugee employment.
33
 There also was a growth in popular 
xenophobia and ‘anti-foreigner’ campaigns. Russian refugees had no particular rights of 
asylum or protection and as stateless had no chance of being in the category of most favoured 
foreigner. In 1925, the Russian Red Cross (Old Organisation) complained to the chief 
Russian refugee representative to the French state, Vasily Maklakov, that Russians in France 
were being denied their rights of asylum. Maklakov replied that ‘the right to asylum has no 
juridical significance and does not grant any specific rights...you are mistaken when you 
claim that all the Russian refugees are here  as emigrants with asylum rights granted by 
France...the overwhelming majority are here as not as emigrants, but as labour forces and 
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therefore subject to special control and reglementation.’34  As well as being subjected to 
protective labour laws, Russian refugees did not always automatically qualify for social 
welfare protection such as unemployment and sickness benefits. Another major issue was that 
of expulsion. Records from Marseille and Lyon indicate that the local French authorities 
often tried to expel refugees and imprisoned those who refused to go, usually because they 
had nowhere to go. 
35
 Driven underground and forced into crime and illegal living, some 
refugees were reduced to a life of trial and imprisonment.  
A further Inter-Governmental Conference was held 28 -30 June 1928 in the hope of resolving 
these issues.  The Russian lawyers met with Johnson before the conference and it was agreed 
that the League of Nations should have the power to perform consular functions for Russian 
refugees in different states; that Russian and Armenian refugees should not suffer in general 
because of any lack of reciprocity; that they should not be penalised in the labour market, or 
expelled from the state; that they should have tax and visa equality with nationals or citizens 
of other states; that they should also enjoy freedom of movement and have an automatic right 
of return unless specifically forbidden.  
36
  A new Arrangement of 30 June 1928 gave the 
Nansen Office the authority to perform consular functions in individual countries for 
refugees, such as certifying their identity and civil status; their former family position and 
status based on documents issued in their country of origin; the regularity, validity and 
conformity of their documents with the previous law of their country of origin issued in that 
country; the signature of refugees; attesting to their character, and recommending them to 
government and educational authorities. France and Belgium concluded an Agreement 
adhering to this, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia informally adopted this system. This provided 
for direct protection by the League of Nations. Refugees should enjoy certain rights usually 
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granted to aliens, subject to reciprocity. It was agreed that their personal status should be 
determined by the laws of domicile or residence, that they should be entitled to free legal 
advice and that they should be treated more sympathetically than foreigners in terms of 
restrictions on labour. Their travel should be also facilitated, with the ‘return clause’ that 
certificate holders had the right to return to the issuing state. This was a voluntary non-
binding arrangement, but many of these points would be codified into international law in the 
1933 Convention Relating to International Status of Refugees.  
This was a genuine step forward in refugee protection and has been described as promoting a 
kind of ‘supranational citizenship’.37 In the absence of diplomatic protection, the refugees 
could benefit from actions taken on their behalf by the League of Nations. It highlighted the 
inadequacy of the reciprocity principle in regard to refugees and signified the first attempt to 
standardize the rights given to refugees. The 1928 Convention went some ways to according 
refugees the same rights as national citizens as well as special rights not given to ordinary 
foreigners. Rubinstein states that the HCR had become a juridical person playing an 
important role in moderating agreements and international normative acts. 
38
 Yet the 
recommendations remained just that, and it was clear that a Convention was needed, where 
all states agreed to a legal definition.  
This Arrangement had less appeal and only thirteen states signed this. Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, France and Lithuania signed it in full. Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and 
Switzerland did not accept the role of the HCR. Greece and Estonia accepted it with 
considerable reservations. Egypt, Finland and Czechoslovakia refused to sign it. According to 
Rubinstein, the ‘majority of states were unwilling to contract formal obligations on behalf of 
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the refugees.’ 39 Governments also believed that only states where refugees had gone should 
have an ‘interest’ in refugees, and that other states had no obligations to them.40 Undaunted, 
the Russian lawyers decided to work towards a Convention. The 1928 Arrangement had 
opened the door just enough.  
In 1928 an Intergovernmental Advisory Commission on Refugees was formed within the 
HCR, consisting of representatives of 14 states where Russian refugees were based and eight 
advisors nominated by the Advisory Committee for Private Organisations of the HCR. This 
included Gul’kevitch, Rubinstein and Nolde. The League decided to call an international 
conference, and questionnaires on the legal status of refugees were sent out to all interested 
governments. Jacques Rubinstein headed a committee looking at the responses and wrote a 
series of recommendations then discussed at the Inter-Governmental Conference on the Legal 
Status of Refugees in June 1928. This recommended transferring all refugee work back to 
Nansen. After Nansen’s death in 1930, an autonomous Nansen International Office for 
Refugees was formed to look after the labour settlement and humanitarian aspects of refugee 
work.  It was to be wound up at the end of 1938 
 
 
 
 
6. The 1933 Refugee Convention  
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In 1930, it was estimated that there were around 400-500,000 Russian refugees in Europe, 
with the largest single concentration in France, around 150-200,000.
41
 As noted above, their 
living conditions were deteriorating and their vulnerability was heightened with the onset of 
the Depression in Europe. The Russian lawyers kept up the pressure for a Convention to 
protect these refugees, particularly as the Nansen Office was destined for closure in 1938. 
The Nansen Office argued that statelessness was still the greatest barrier to the improvement 
of the conditions of the refugees. 
42
 Refugees as a social group were least favoured in the 
‘struggle for existence’, as states became more nationalistic and protective of their own 
citizens.  As foreigners, they had fewer rights than citizens or those with most favoured 
foreigner status.  Being stateless, they found it hard to get visas to move on if they lost 
employment and thus were at risk of falling into vagrancy or expulsion even though they had 
nowhere to go. As Rubinstein commented ‘the expulsion of a stateless person is a shameful 
thing...to the expelled refugee all frontiers are closed, all territories forbidden; he is 
confronted by two sovereign wills, that of the State that says “go” and that of the State that 
says “stay out”.’43 Dewhurst-Lewis cites the case of one Russian in Marseille, Boris M. who 
was imprisoned nine times between 1932-36 for vagrancy and failing to honour his expulsion 
order.
44
  
 The Advisory Committee for Refugees held a second meeting in September 1930 to look at 
the future organisation of refugee work.
 45
 A ‘radical solution’ for the refugees still needed to 
be found.  Neither repatriation nor mass naturalisation was an option. In 1929 the Tenth 
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Assembly of the League suggested the wholesale naturalisation of refugees and the HCR 
carried an inquiry as to whether states would consider this. This proposal was decisively 
rejected by states. Naturalisation was seen as an individual act ‘gifted’ by the state. 46 
Naturalisation data was not easy to come by, but the Nansen Office estimated that only about 
seven per cent of refugees had been naturalised.
47
  Few refugees seemed to actively seek out 
naturalisation.  The majority of Russian refugees even by 1930 had not given up hope of the 
Soviet regime collapsing, a hope that may have seemed realistic at this point at the Soviet 
Union was convulsed by peasant uprisings during forced collectivization.  
In August 1931 the Inter-governmental Advisory Commission on Refugees met in Geneva 
for its Fourth Session and endorsed the establishment of a Convention to stabilise the legal 
situation of the refugees.  This was supported by the Twelfth League Assembly. A 
Committee of Experts was set up and more information was gathered about the legal status of 
refugees in individual states. Initial preparations were not auspicious. Thirteen states did not 
respond to the drafting of the Convention passed to them in late 1931. 
48
 This lack of interest 
allowed the Russian lawyers more freedom to push forward their own ideas.  On 26 October 
1933 the Inter-governmental Conference on Refugees was convened in Geneva, with the 
participation of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Britain, Germany and 
Lithuania were invited but did not attend. On 28 October 1933, The Convention Relating to 
the International Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees was announced. The 
Russian lawyers had achieved some of what they hoped for. As Rubinstein later explained in 
a speech in London  
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It [the Convention] betters the Nansen certificate system, it restricts abuses in the 
practice of expulsion, and it regulates certain points of private international law. 
Furthermore, it secures for refugees freedom of access to the law courts, and the most 
favourable treatment in respect of social life and assurance and of taxation; it exempts 
them from the rule of reciprocity, it provides for the optional institution of refugee 
committees in every country and it secures certain modifications of the measures 
restricting employment.
49
 
Yet he also pointed out its main flaw; that it did not give all refugees the same rights as 
nationals in employment, only four privileged categories, and states had made the largest 
number of reservations around employment.   
The Convention has been described as a landmark in human rights legislation and the 
protection of refugees. It was the first binding multilateral instrument to offer refugees legal 
protection and guarantee their political and civil rights. It was also one of the first 
contributions to establishing a voluntary system of international supervision of human 
rights.
50
  The 1933 Convention limited state’s rights to expulsion through the principle of 
non-refoulement. Stated in article 3, this declared that the state should guarantee ‘not to 
remove or keep from its territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or 
non-admittance at the frontier (refouler) refugees who have been authorised to reside their 
regularly, unless (for reasons of) national security or public order.’ This restricted the 
sovereign right of states to expel aliens, one of the key elements of state sovereignty, 
although it did not actually guarantee an individual’s right to asylum or admission to the 
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state, as it was to apply to those already resident in the state.
51
 The Convention gave the 
Nansen Office the ability to intervene in cases of expulsion. In 1934-35, the Nansen Office 
interceded in France on behalf of 1,596 Russians subject to expulsion orders, and as many as 
4,000 had expulsion orders against them. Expulsion orders rose again in 1939.
52
 
Refugees were particularly impacted as they could not move back to their own state (or easily 
to another) if their employment was terminated. One important element of the Convention 
was that laws restricting foreign labour should not be applied to specific groups of refugees; 
those who had lived in the state for at least three years; who were married to a national; who 
had children who were nationals, or who had been a combatant in the Great War. 
Czechoslovakia rejected this outright and a number of other states made reservations.  In 
terms of the right to social welfare and education, the Convention stated that refugees should 
be given the most favourable treatment the state gives to nationals of a foreign country. These 
were broadly accepted. The Convention has been seen as most successful in this area, as 
states made more effort to provide social provisions for refugees.
53
 Article 14 of the 
Convention stated that ‘the enjoyment of certain rights and the benefit of certain favours 
accorded to foreigners subject to reciprocity shall not be refused to refugees in the absence of 
reciprocity.’ As noted above, the Napoleonic Code was based on reciprocity and thus 
stateless refugees could be deprived of various rights, such as the right to inherit, to appear in 
court, to be a trustee, to acquire a patent or to receive employment accident compensation. 
Only France accepted this without reservation. 
54
  
7. Reasons for Accepting Limits to State Sovereignty  
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Why did some states agree (and others refuse) to the Convention and other instruments of the 
refugee regime in the 1920s which put limits on their sovereignty? Some states had close 
relations with Russian émigré groups dating back to the Civil War, or even before. Although 
life for the refugees became harder in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, the government there 
resisted Soviet pressure to cut official ties with Russian refugee groups despite their 
increasing need for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Czechoslovak elites constructed 
an idea of new national identity that was caught up with exile and flight, from religious 
refugees fleeing Catholic restoration in the early seventeenth century, to the exile experiences 
of Masaryk and Beneš and others fighting for an independent Czechoslovak state.55 They also 
wanted to play a leading role in the new international order and to be seen as a leading liberal 
democratic state at the heart of the new world order. . Similarly Bulgaria and Yugoslavia may 
have been influenced by pan-Slavism and personal links with the pre-revolutionary Russian 
elites, as well as a desire to be seen to be part of the new international community.  France 
had a large and relatively stable Russian refugee population who it may have wanted to 
support so as to be seen as adhering to French traditional liberal principles of offering asylum 
at not too much risk. Other times, granting refugee rights was done in the hope they may 
move on; this was a source of support for the Nansen passport in all its forms. Granting a five 
year extension to right to return, as did some states, was a way of making it more likely other 
states would then accept them.  Robert Beck has analysed why Britain adhered to the 
Convention. Britain did not contribute to preliminary discussions or attend the Conference. 
One of Britain’s main concerns with the Russian refugees had always been their fear that not 
only Great Britain itself, but also the Dominions would be forced to accept them, particularly 
when the refugee issue was managed by the ILO. The Foreign Office wrote to Geneva in 
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1933 that ‘The Home Office, Colonial Office, Dominions Office and the Ministry of Labour 
are especially anxious to avoid being placed in the position of having to turn down, or to act 
upon any immigration or settlement recommendations coming from such a source [the 
League]. 
56
 Their attitude was also that they had very few refugees in Great Britain, so the 
issue of refugees was nothing to do with them. This was a refusal to see refugees as an 
international responsibility as well as a refusal to make other states accept general obligations 
to refugees, which they saw as an encroachment on other states’ sovereignty.   The British 
state wished to retain the right to deal with stateless refugees as aliens under the Aliens Order 
of 1920.   However, Britain signed an Instrument of Accession to the 1933 Convention in 
October 1936, after it was established that refugees from Germany would not be included in 
it. They agreed to sign it for stateless refugees only, and rejected the non-refoulement clause. 
The statelessness was important as by only protecting this group, they were not impacting on 
the state sovereignty of the refugees’ country of origin. British policy makers defined 
sovereignty in territorial terms and would only offer protection to refugees without a state. 
Additionally, it cost little for Britain to adhere to the Convention as it had very few Nansen 
passport holders but it made it look like a reasonable player. By this decision the British 
acknowledged refugees as an international responsibility. The Dutch also adhered to the 1922 
and 1924 arrangements to preserve their image as a hospitable and liberal state, though they 
had accepted very few refugees and their motivation for issuing Nansen passports was the 
traditional one of ensuring the refugees could move on.
57
 
8. The Impact of the 1933 Convention 
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The Convention was only ratified by eight countries; Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, France, Italy, Norway and the UK. Italy, Czechoslovakia and the UK made 
reservations about the principle of admission at the frontier. Estonia, Finland, Iraq, Greece, 
Latvia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States did not sign it, but applied it in practice. 
Egypt signed it but did not ratify it. 
58
   
The Convention came into force in 1935 and the standard was set that refugees should have 
the same treatment as most favoured foreigners.  The legal situation of Russian refugees 
remained very varied and the reservations of the states acceding to the Convention restricted 
in particular the right to work. Russian legal experts stated that the legal situation for refugees 
was considered positive in France, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Switzerland, all of whom 
adhered to the Convention.  In other states with substantial Russian refugee populations such 
as China, Poland and Romania, which had not signed the Convention, their situation was 
precarious and arbitrary. In France, the Popular Front government under Leon Blum ratified 
the Convention and adopted a non-restrictive policy towards refugees. The right to asylum 
was identified with the right to work and social service provision was widened in general in 
this period. This was ended by the Daladier government which came to power in 1938, 
though the Nansen passport holders remained protected. Local authorities could try to avoid 
their responsibilities; Hassell writes that in 1938 the Paris region of Billancourt, the home of 
the Renault works, gave no unemployment benefit to Russians who tried to move elsewhere. 
59
   The Marseille municipal government tried to argue that it could not afford to give 
unemployment benefits to stateless persons, but this was rejected by the centre.  
60
 Even if 
local authorities had varying attitudes to refugees they had to accept centrally taken decisions. 
Belgium signed the Convention in 1933 with the reservations that Russian refugees were not 
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to benefit from the advantages given to Dutch, French and Luxembourg immigrants and they 
could still be expelled. This was later criticized in the Belgian Parliament as ‘national 
egoism’.  Yet even before the Convention was ratified in 1937, following the French example 
Russian refugee workers were exempted from dismissal under the Decree of 1935 which 
declared ceilings on the employment of foreign labour in the mining industry. 
61
 They also 
benefitted from the Convention in other ways, for example they gained the unqualified right 
to work in Belgium after five years residency, whereas the time limit was ten years for other 
foreigners. The proviso allowing for expulsion was also dropped by the Belgian authorities, 
although they could have their movements limited if they were considered a danger to 
national security.  
Russian Refugee Lawyers and the HCR  
Many scholars have noted how individuals and non-State actors challenged State sovereignty 
in the interwar period. The Russian lawyers formed an epistemic community and the final 
achievement of their work was the 1933 Convention. The sources for the Convention have 
been identified as international aliens’ law and the protection of national minorities.  These 
were areas of expertise for the Russian lawyers abroad, and many formed organisations and 
pressure groups to push for new rights.  In 1926 in Germany, for example, the Verband der 
Staatenlozen, was set up, which was formed of many nationalities, but chiefly Russians. They 
also wanted stateless people to have the same rights as either nationals or most favoured 
foreigners. 
62
 Most of the impetus for the development of refugee protection therefore in the 
interwar period came from refugees themselves. Possibly HCR interests in repatriation and 
colonisation acted as a brake. In 1936 Johnson wrote that the mass settlement of refugees 
abroad was still in his view the solution to the refugee problem. He resented the involvement 
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of Russian refugee representatives (‘enterprising jurists’) on the Governing Body and 
Managing Committee of the Nansen Organisation.
63
 He stated that he and Nansen had always 
been opposed to refugees forming a ‘permanent institution, a kind of new nationality’ in 
Europe with their own rights of representation.
64
 Even as late as 1936, when Terror was 
beginning on a mass scale in the Soviet Union, Johnson insisted that repatriation had been the  
correct policy and expressed resentment and frustration at refugee groups for ‘sabotaging’ it. 
65
  In the interwar period both the HCR and the ILO invested hope and resources in 
colonisation schemes in Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. Johnson claimed that Albert 
Thomas, the Director of the ILO, wanted the refugee work to form the nucleus of 
transforming the ILO into an ‘international employment agency’66 As noted above, this was 
particularly resisted by the British and the Dominions who feared an ‘immigration 
dictatorship’ by the ILO and an attack on their sovereignty. 67 The colonisation schemes in 
South America were unrealistic and unpopular with Russians.
68
 
The Russian lawyers on their other hand wished for Russian consulates abroad to be 
recognised by states as legal representatives of the refugees, preserving the sovereignty of the 
pre-Bolshevik Russian state abroad. The Russian legal experts had similar backgrounds. 
Several (Mandelstam, Rubinstein, Vishnyak) were Russian Jews from the Russian Empire, 
who had an understanding of multiple overlapping identities and issues of minority 
protection. Many had also worked for the Tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
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Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire was the testing ground for ideas of minority protection, 
limits on state sovereignty and international humanitarian intervention. One of the key 
Russian lawyers in the interwar period advising on refugee law was Andrei Mandelstam 
(1869-1949). Mandelstam worked for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had been a 
Dragoman at the Russian Embassy in Constantinople before the Great War and had 
developed a proposal for the international territorial administration for an Armenian province 
in 1913.
69
 Throughout his legal career Mandelstam argued against an absolutist concept of 
sovereignty in favour of a liberal one which emphasised the relativity of sovereignty and 
therefore a role for international human rights legislation. 
70
 Interwar legal ideas about the 
limits on state sovereignty were influenced by earlier Russian interventions in the Ottoman 
Empire and the capitulations policies. After 1930, Russian refugee lawyers gained official 
positions within the Nansen Office and drove their projects through to the 1933 Convention.  
Johnson complained in his memoir, that once there, they started ‘putting into effect their old 
policy of establishing the refugees as some kind of permanent nationality with themselves as 
their diplomatic and consular agents.’ 71  He continued to insist that this was the wrong 
approach, but in many ways it was how refugee protection law was developed. The Russian 
(and others) refugees became a protected nationality in Europe. Their representatives 
envisaged that they would keep this protected status, and not be sent abroad or naturalised en 
masse, but that they would still adapt to, and be absorbed in their new states. They hoped that 
this would be a single generational status, as more states like France adopted enlightened 
citizenship laws allowing all children born in the state to claim citizenship.  
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Conclusion 
In 1934 the Nansen International Office for Refugees estimated there were about one million 
Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, Assryo-Chaldean and Turkish refugees in Europe. In some 
countries about fifty per cent were unemployed, while twenty five per cent were unable to 
work. 
72
 They noted that ‘Practically every one of the refugees represents a problem of some 
kind for the Office.’ 73 Governments were still restricting the rights of foreigners to work and 
expelling refugees. They called for the proper application of the 1933 Convention, which had 
provided for an international status for refugees and asked again that measures taken against 
foreigners should not be applied rigorously to refugees. They asked states to:   
to establish conditions which would enable the decision already taken by various 
States...to become fully effective; that the refugees should be ensured the enjoyment 
of civil rights, free and ready access to the courts, security and stability as regards 
establishment and work, facilities in the exercise of professions, of industry and of 
commerce; and in regard to the movement of persons, admissions to schools and 
universities. 
74
  
Europe saw many more refugees in the late 1930s from Nazi Germany and Spain. In 1939, 
Joseph Roth compared the fate of these new refugees with that of the earlier Russians. In his 
reportage ‘Old Cossacks’, he writes of a Russian Cossack troupe of experienced musicians 
who he first came across in the early 1920s, ‘the earliest victims of a world which was just 
beginning to make people stateless, and things hadn’t yet gotten really tough’. Seeing them 
again in 1939 older and more tired, after twenty years of travelling (‘It wasn’t really 
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travelling, it was more that they had themselves forwarded’), he reflects on the fates of 
stateless Jews in Paris: 
A new wave of refugees has arrived in the city. You and I for instance with a pain 
that’s twenty years fresher. And our destinies will be haggled over in ministries rather 
than in concert agencies. But we too will be going on a lot of ‘tours’ that one would 
have to be a real Cossack to survive.
75
.  
The Russian refugee was a common figure in the inter-war cultural imaginary, depicted for 
example the reportage of George Orwell and Joseph Roth and the fiction of interwar thriller 
writers such as Eric Ambler and Leo Perutz.  Typically featuring as ex-Tsarist Officers, 
resourceful, philosophical, rather dashing, tenacious, entrepreneurial, and positioned in a 
flexible boundary between legality and illegality. Not for the Russian was the internment 
camp which was to be the fate of refugees in the 1930s and 1940s; instead they were seen as 
travelling along a mobile trajectory to and from such cities as Constantinople, Belgrade, 
Marseille, Sofia, Prague and Paris. Even Hannah Arendt, who understood that as stateless 
people, Russian refugees were also ‘the scum of the earth’, expelled from humanity and 
living under conditions of absolute lawlessness, she still described them as ‘the aristocracy, in 
every sense, of the stateless persons.’ 76 The League of Nations and the Nansen passport did 
offer them some protection and the ability to make life choices by limiting state sovereignty. 
The attempts at resolving the legal status of refugees took some time as the HCR hoped that 
other solutions –repatriation, colonisation and naturalisation - would work.  
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The 1933 Convention did not institute equality of treatment between refugees and nationals. 
However, it was an incremental improvement in the legal status of refugees and legitimised 
the idea that national human rights standards should be subject to international supervision, as 
well as the principle of non-refoulement. The notion of waiving reciprocity, usually the basis 
for international relations, was key to formulating modern notions of human rights. In terms 
of continuity, the connections with the 1951 Refugee Convention lay in the principles that 
refugees are a distinct category of migrants deserving special protection and should not be 
sent back to a country of persecution.  A further connection was the involvement of 
international organizations.
77
 Claudena Skran describes refugee law in the interwar period as 
a success, and a mixture of optimism that legal norms could have positive political effects 
and pragmatism in dealing with the crisis. 
78
  
The interwar refugee regime which emerged in the 1920s tried to account for the anomaly of 
statelessness in a system where protection was tied to the sovereignty of states. Culminating 
in the Convention of 1933, liberal states such as Czechoslovakia, Belgium, France and the 
United Kingdom agreed to limit their own sovereignty for those refugees already residing in 
their states. This loss of sovereignty meant amongst other policies, that they agreed to protect 
refugees’ right to work, grant them social benefits and protect them from expulsion. All this 
came at a financial cost and also a political cost to these states, as various groups (trade 
unions for example) were opposed to this. The Convention led to an increasing awareness 
among policy makers that ‘refugees’ are an exceptional category of immigrants.  One of the 
main reasons, in particular for countries with few refugees, of signing the Convention was the 
desire to be seen as liberal, which emphasises the importance of the protection of liberal 
values overall as the best way to protect the rights of refugees, particularly in the current 
political climate and in countries with few refugees. .   
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